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THE OPEN FUTURE, FREE WILL 
AND DIVINE ASSURANCE:
RESPONDING TO THREE COMMON OBJECTIONS 
TO THE OPEN VIEW
GREGORY A. BOYD
Abstract. In this essay I respond to three of the most forceful objections to the 
open view of the future. It is argued that a) open view advocates must deny 
bivalence; b) the open view offers no theodicy advantages over classical theism; 
and c) the open view can’t assure believers that God can work all things to the 
better (Rom. 8:28). I argue that the first objection is premised on an inadequate 
assessment of future tensed propositions, the second is rooted in an inadequate 
assessment of free will, and the third is grounded in an inadequate assessment 
of God’s intelligence.
In this essay I’ll address three of the most forceful and most frequently 
voiced objections to open theism (or, as I prefer, ‘the open view of the 
future’, which I  will henceforth abbreviate simply as ‘the open view’). 
The first objection is that, to render their view coherent, advocates of 
the open view must accept one or the other of two strongly counter-
intuitive and otherwise problematic conclusions: they must either 
accept (i) that bivalence doesn’t apply to propositions about future free 
actions, or (ii) that the truth value of such propositions is unknowable 
to God. The second objection I’ll address is that the open view offers 
no advantage for resolving the problem of evil over the view that God 
possesses exhaustively definite foreknowledge (EDF), for denying that 
God eternally foreknew an evil deed leaves unexplained why God didn’t 
intervene to prevent the deed once God saw it was inevitable, or at least 
highly probable. And the third objection I’ll consider is the frequently 
voiced claim that, if God doesn’t foreknow all that will come to pass in the 
future, God cannot assure believers that God can bring good out of evil 
and work all things together for the better (Rom. 8:28). It is rather argued 
that the open view must accept that our suffering may be completely 
outside God’s purposes and therefore gratuitous.
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In what follows I shall argue that the first two objections are grounded 
in oversights regarding the logic of the future and of free will, while the 
last objection is grounded in a limited view of God.
THE THREE CATEGORIES OF FUTURE TENSED PROPOSITIONS
To begin, the objection that open view advocates must either deny 
bivalence or accept that certain truths are impossible for God to know 
is grounded in the traditional conviction that omniscience implies that 
God’s knowledge of the future must be expressed exhaustively in terms 
of what either will or will not come to pass. The basic line of reasoning 
behind this conviction is as follows.
P1:  All propositions asserting factual claims are either true or false 
(bivalence).
P2: Being omniscient, God knows the truth value of all meaningful 
propositions.
P3: The future can be exhaustively described in terms of what either 
will or will not come to pass.
C: Therefore, God foreknows the future exhaustively in terms of what 
either will or will not come to pass. In other words, God possesses 
EDF.
The argument is formally valid. Accordingly, those who deny the 
conclusion (C) must deny one or more of the premises. Some advocates 
of the open view deny (P1) and instead argue that propositions expressing 
future free actions are neither true nor false until the free agent renders 
them true or false by their free decision. Opponents point out that, 
among other problems, denying bivalence to propositions about future 
free actions is a  drastic and strongly counter-intuitive strategy. Other 
advocates of the open view attempt to avoid (C) by denying (P2), arguing 
instead that, while propositions about future free actions are indeed either 
true or false, this truth value is logically impossible to know, even for 
God. Opponents point out that, among other problems, the postulation 
of propositions whose truth value cannot be known seems to undermine 
the very definition of omniscience.
Whether or not one considers these objections to be decisive, 
I  contend that there is no reason for advocates of the open view to 
embrace either of these questionable strategies. I  submit that the real 
flaw in the above-mentioned argument resides not in (P1) or in (P2), but 
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in (P3). The traditional assumption that the future can be exhaustively 
expressed in terms of what will and will not come to pass overlooks 
an  entire category of future tensed propositions whose truth value 
an omniscient God must know. It may be the case that (i) a future event 
E will certainly come to pass, and it may be the case that (ii) a  future 
event E will certainly not come to pass. What was overlooked, however, 
is that it may also be the case that (iii) a future event E might and might 
not come to pass, in which case it would be false both that E will certainly 
come to pass and that E will certainly not come to pass.
So far as I can discern, the primary reason for this oversight was that it 
has been customarily assumed that propositions such as ‘E will certainly 
come to pass’ are the logical contradictory of propositions such as ‘E will 
certainly not come to pass’. If they are indeed contradictory, they exhaust 
all the possibilities. Hence, one of the propositions must be true and 
the other false. From this it followed that propositions asserting what 
will and will not certainly come to pass exhaust the field of meaningful 
propositions about the future whose truth value an  omniscient God 
must know. Hence God must possess EDF.
Against this, I contend that the contradictory of ‘E will certainly come 
to pass’ is not ‘E will certainly not come to pass’, but rather, ‘It is not the 
case that E will certainly come to pass’. This logically entails that ‘E might 
not come to pass’. So too, the contradictory of ‘E will certainly not come 
to pass’ is not ‘E will certainly come to pass’, but rather, ‘It is not the case 
that E will certainly come to pass’. This logically implies that ‘E might 
come to pass’.
If we apply the Square of Opposition to this assessment (see the 
Appendix), it becomes apparent that ‘E will certainly come to pass’ and 
‘E will certainly not come to pass’ are contraries, not contradictories. 
As such, both cannot be true, but both may be false. So too, it becomes 
clear that ‘E might come to pass’ and ‘E might not come to pass’ are sub-
contraries, not contradictories. As such, both cannot be false, but both 
may be true. And in cases in which ‘might’ and ‘might not’ propositions 
are conjointly true, both of their logical contradictories  – viz. ‘E will 
certainly come to pass’ and ‘E will certainly not come to pass’  – are 
necessarily false.
If this assessment is correct, we must accept that there are three, 
not merely two, categories of meaningful propositions about the future 
whose truth value an omniscient God must know. An adequate mapping 
of propositions expressing possible future state of affairs must include:
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(i) propositions asserting a  determinate affirmation  – viz. ‘will 
certainly occur’;
(ii) propositions asserting a determinate negation – viz. ‘will certainly 
not occur’; and
(iii) propositions asserting an indeterminate affirmation and negation – 
viz. ‘might and might not occur’.
Moreover, if this assessment is correct, it means the traditional view of 
divine foreknowledge is anchored in the fact that an entire domain of 
logically possible worlds that God could have created was overlooked: 
namely, all logically possible worlds that include, to one degree or another, 
an  indeterminate future. The distinct claim of open view advocates is 
that, not only is a world with an indeterminate future logically possible, 
but we have compelling biblical, philosophical and experiential reasons 
to believe that this is, in fact, the kind of world God decided to create.
In this light, I trust it is clear why open view advocates need not deny 
that bivalence applies to future tensed propositions about future free 
actions. We simply need to apply bivalence to three categories of future 
tensed propositions rather than to two. Open view advocates can thus 
affirm that God knows the truth value of all meaningful propositions, 
including propositions about future free actions. The only distinct claim 
of open view advocates should be that propositions asserting what 
might and might not come to pass can be conjointly true, in which case 
corresponding propositions asserting what will and will not come to 
pass must be conjointly false.
THE IRREVOCABILITY OF FREE WILL
The second common objection to the open view that I’d like to address 
concerns the allegation that the open view offers no advantage in terms 
of resolving the problem of evil compared to the view that ascribes EDF 
to God. Even if we grant that God didn’t eternally foreknow a particular 
evil deed would take place, the argument goes, we yet have to explain why 
God didn’t intervene to prevent the deed once God saw it was inevitable, 
or at least saw that it was highly probable. And the latter problem, it 
is plausibly argued, is as great as the former. What real difference does 
it make whether God decided to allow Hitler to embark on the Final 
Solution an eternity before it took place or merely a year or a week before 
it was certain to take place? So long as we believe God has the power 
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to intervene, which seems to be implied in omnipotence, it makes no 
difference when God makes the decision not to intervene to prevent 
an evil.
I shall argue that this objection is rooted in an inadequate assessment 
of the logic of libertarian free will that leads to the mistaken assumption 
that an all-powerful God must be able to prevent any event God would 
like to prevent.
While there is a  multitude of contested philosophical issues 
surrounding the concept and conditions of (libertarian) free will, for 
our present purposes the following minimalistic definition will suffice: 
Agents possess free will if and only if they have the capacity to resolve, by 
their own volition, two or more possible courses of action into one actual 
course of action. Libertarian free will, in other words, refers to an agent’s 
God-given self-determining capacity to actualize this possible course of 
action or that possible course of action.
If this basic understanding of free will is accepted, I believe we can 
begin to understand how an all-powerful God would be unable to prevent 
events God wished could be prevented. Suppose God has endowed 
a particular agent (x) with the self-determining capacity to choose to go 
this way or that way – this way representing a way God approves of and 
that way representing a way God disapproves of. If God were to then 
prevent agent (x) from going that way because God disapproved of it, 
it would then become clear that, as a matter of fact, God didn’t endow 
agent (x) with the self-determining capacity to choose to go this way 
or that way. Conversely, if God truly endowed agent (x) with the self-
determining capacity to choose to go this way or that way, God must, by 
definition, allow agent (x) to go that way, if agent (x) so chooses.
Another way of stating this is to say that free will is, by definition, 
irrevocable. The concept of God preventing an agent from freely going 
that way once God has endowed the agent with the self-determining 
capacity to choose to go this way or that way is self-contradictory, no 
different from the concept of a round triangle or married bachelor. And 
just as God’s omnipotence isn’t limited by God’s inability to make a round 
triangle or a  married bachelor, so too, I  contend, God’s omnipotence 
isn’t limited by God’s inability to revoke free will once God’s given it. 
Moreover, it’s important to realize that in the initial decision to give 
agents free will, God is granting them the capacity to freely resolve 
every possible course of action they might face in the future, for as we’ll 
see below, an omniscient God would know every possible decision the 
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agent might make when God gives them scope of free will he gives them. 
The irrevocability of free will, therefore, must apply to every possible 
decision that falls within the scope of the God-given free will of an agent 
throughout the duration of that agent’s life.
If this much is accepted, it seems to me that the open view can be 
shown to offer a distinct advantage explaining evil over and against all 
traditional views that hold that God merely chooses not to intervene to 
prevent each particular episode of evil. For if God merely chooses to not 
prevent a particular episode of evil, God must in some sense want that 
particular episode of evil to take place, at least more than God wants 
to prevent it. And since God is all-good, every decision God makes, 
including the decision to not prevent a particular episode of evil, must be 
good. This perspective thus requires us to accept that there is a specific 
good divine reason behind each and every episode of evil throughout 
history. In my opinion, this constitutes the most challenging aspect of the 
classical theistic solution to the problem of evil. If we accept the essential 
irrevocability of free will, however, we no longer have to claim that God 
merely chooses not to prevent evil. We would instead claim that, given 
the kind of world God decided to create – viz. a world populated with 
free agents  – God is unable to unilaterally intervene to prevent freely 
chosen evil, as much as God would like to.
While we may specify reasons as to why God decided to create 
a cosmos that was populated with free agents, this view does not require 
us to suppose there is a  specific good divine reason behind episodes 
of evil. Rather, the ultimate reason why any particular episode of evil 
came to pass lies in the agent who chose to bring it about, not in God. 
Hence, in the face of any particular evil, it would make sense in this 
view to ask: ‘Why did God decide to create a  cosmos populated with 
free agents?’, a question that has a plausible answer, in my opinion. And 
it would make sense in this view to ask: ‘Why did this particular agent 
bring about this particular evil?’ But it would not make sense in this view 
to ask: ‘Why did God allow this agent to bring about this particular evil?’ 
For this irrevocable permission is already implied in asserting that God 
endowed the agent with free will. Hence, the ultimate reason for each 
episode of evil, in this view, ends with the agent(s) who chose to carry it 
out. God had no reason for whatever evil an agent freely brings about: 
God simply could not stop it, given that he decided to create this kind of 
world populated with these kinds of agents. And that great advantage of 
this perspective is that it completely relieves us of the torturous burden 
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of positing a specific good divine reason behind every specific episode 
in history.
DIVINE ASSURANCE AND THE OPEN FUTURE
The third and final commonly raised objection against the open view also 
concerns God’s inability to intervene to prevent evils in the open view. 
It is frequently argued that a God who faced a partly open future could 
not promise believers that there is a divine purpose for their suffering or 
that God can ultimately bring good out of evil (Rom 8:28). Indeed, some 
conservative critics have argued that the open view posits a  ‘limited, 
passive, hand-wringing God’ who can do little more than hope for the 
best. ‘[W]hat is lost in open theism,’ Bruce Ware contends,
... is the Christian’s confidence in God ... .When we are told that God ... 
can only guess what much of the future will bring ... [and] constantly sees 
his beliefs about the future proved wrong by what in fact transpires ... 
Can a believer know that God will triumph in the future just as he has 
promised he will? (2000: 216)
Opponents of the open view have done an  excellent job preventing 
people from seriously considering this view by installing fear in them 
with frequently voiced terrifying claims such as this. Most people have 
an  understandable desire, if not need, to believe that their suffering 
and/or the suffering of loved ones is not simply random and gratuitous, 
but rather serves an ultimate, good divine purpose. They thus long for 
the assurance that God can work all things together and bring good 
out of evil, and any view that can’t deliver on these promises is simply 
a nonstarter.
I  think open view advocates must frankly admit that our view 
does in fact entail that suffering happens randomly. Once one denies 
that there is a  specific divine reason behind each specific episode of 
suffering that comes to pass and instead affirms that the final reason 
behind any episode of suffering resides in the agent(s) who carried it 
out, this conclusion is unavoidable. At the same time, I do not believe 
that acknowledging this entails that God cannot promise to bring good 
out of evil or to have an ultimate purpose for all suffering. Indeed, I will 
now argue that, so long as we are confident that God possesses unlimited 
intelligence, the open view can offer believers the same level of assurance 
as the traditional view that ascribes EDF to God and believes this gives 
God a providential advantage.
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I  submit that the reason why so many assume God is less able to 
have a plan to bring good out of evil if the future is partly comprised 
of possibilities than if the future is exhaustively settled is because they 
project their own human limitations onto God. We humans are obviously 
less able to effectively prepare for a multitude of possible future events 
than we are a single future event that is certain, and the reason is that we 
only have a finite amount of intelligence to anticipate the future with. 
Hence, the more possibilities we have to anticipate, the thinner we have 
to spread our intelligence to anticipate each of them. This is why, for 
example, playing a formidable opponent in an important game of chess 
is more stressful than (say) working on an assembly line where a person 
knows exactly what is coming.
If we affirm that God has unlimited intelligence, however, God 
would not have to spread thin God’s intelligence to cover any number 
of possibilities. A  God of unlimited intelligence could attend to each 
and every one of a gazillion possibilities (to the gazillionth power!) as 
though each and every one was the only possibility – viz. as though each 
was an  absolute certainty. There is therefore no functional difference 
between the way a  God of unlimited intelligence would anticipate 
a future possibility and a future certainty. There is therefore no functional 
difference between the way the open view of God anticipates each and 
every one of the possible future story lines that comprise the open future 
and the way the traditional God who possesses EDF anticipates the 
single, exhaustively settled, future story line. To put it in other words, 
since God’s intelligence has no limit, it is as though all of God’s attention 
is on each possible story line – exactly the same as it would be if each 
possible story line was the only possible story line, viz. as if each was the 
one and only exhaustively settled story line of the traditional view.
This means that the advocate of the open view can affirm as robustly 
as any defender of the traditional view that, whatever comes to past, God 
has been preparing a plan, from the foundation of the world, as to how 
God would respond to bring good out of this event, however evil the event 
itself may be. It’s just that the open view advocate is confident enough in 
God’s intelligence to affirm that God didn’t need to foreknow this event 
as a certainty to prepare for it as if it were a certainty. Any number of 
other possible events might have taken place, and if they had, the open 
view advocate would be claiming the exact same thing about them!
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We might say that a God of unlimited intelligence doesn’t need to have 
a specific eternal purpose for specific events in order to bring an equally 
specific eternally prepared purpose to these events. Hence, whereas the 
traditional view has always affirmed that everything happens for a good 
divine purpose, open view advocates can affirm that everything happens 
with a good divine purpose. And the good purpose God brings to events 
is just as perfect as it would have been had God specifically allowed that 
event for this good purpose. The open view advocate can thus affirm the 
same divine assurance as classical theists, but without the terrible burden 
of claiming that God specifically allowed, or ordained, evil events for 
a good divine purpose.
I trust it’s apparent why only a God of limited intelligence would lose 
a  providential advantage by virtue of knowing a  future that included 
possibilities as opposed to a  future that was exhaustively settled. 
When Bruce Ware asserts that a  God who faced a  future comprised 
of possibilities would be a  ‘limited, passive, hand-wringing God’ who 
could do little more than ‘guess what much of the future will bring’, 
he is unwittingly tipping his hand to his own limited view of God’s 
intelligence while telling us nothing about the actual view of God that 
open view advocates embrace (or at least ought to embrace). And given 
his and others’ limited view of God, it’s hardly surprising that Bruce 
Ware and others continually express great fear when they consider the 
consequences of God facing a future that isn’t exhaustively settled ahead 
of time.
If we simply remain confident in God’s unlimited intelligence, the last 
thing we can ever imagine God doing is wringing his hands and making 
guesses in the face of a partly open future.
APPENDIX
THE HEXAGONIC LOGIC OF AN OPEN FUTURE1
Whereas the Aristotelian Square assigns no primitive operator to 
a  future indeterminate state of affairs, thus exemplifying a  prejudice 
toward determinism, we will use Q as a primitive operator meaning, ‘It is 
indeterminately the case that ...’ alongside primitive operator Z meaning, 
1 From G. Boyd, T. Belt and A. Rhodes, ‘The Hexagon of Opposition: Thinking Outside 
the Aristotelian Box’ (unpublished manuscript).
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‘It is determinately the case that ...’ We will thus revise the Square in such 
a way that Q will be granted the same logical status as Z.
Using Q and Z as defined, we arrive at:
Z(S) = It is determinately the case that state of affairs S occur (‘S will 
obtain’)
Z(~S) = It is determinately the case that state of affairs not-S occur (‘S 
will not obtain’)
Q(S) = It is indeterminately the case that state of affairs S occur 
(‘S might and might not obtain’)
Each of these propositions affirms a  distinct metaphysical possibility 
concerning any possible future state of affairs. These possibilities are 
jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive. As jointly exhaustive, at least 
one must be true for any meaningful future tense proposition. Thus we 
arrive at our first theorem:
 – (S) [(Z(S) v Z(~S) v Q(S)].
As mutually exclusive, if any one is true, then the other two must be false, 
giving us three additional theorems:
 – Z(S) ⇔ ~Z(~S) ∧ ~Q(S)
 – Z(~S) ⇔ ~Z(S) ∧ ~Q(S)
 – Q(S) ⇔ ~Z(S) ∧ ~Z(~S)
Because no two can be true at the same time, while any two can be false 
at the same time, these three possibilities are related as contraries, which 
we can represent by the following Triangle of Contrary Relations.
Z(S) Z(~S)
Q(S)
 contrary 
 c
o
n
tra
ry
 
 c
o
n
tr
a
ry
 
Fig. 1: Triangle of Contrary Relations
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This Triangle of Contrary Relations generates a Triangle of Subcontrary 
Relations when we associate each possibility with its the contradictory. 
Consider first Z(S) (‘It is determinately the case that state of affairs 
S obtain’). The contradictory of Z(S) is, of course, ~Z(S) (‘It is not 
determinately the case that state of affairs S obtain’) and can be illustrated 
as follows:
Z(S) Z(~S)
Q(S)
~Z(S)
 contrary 
 c
o
n
tra
ry
 
 c
o
n
tr
a
ry
 
 contradictory 
Fig. 2: Contradictory of Z(S)
The contradictory of Z(~S) (‘It is determinately the case that state of 
affairs not-S obtain’) is ~Z  (~S) (‘It is not determinately the case that 
state of affairs not-S obtain’) which we locate opposite its contradictory:
Z(S) Z(~S)
Q(S)
~Z(S)~Z(~S)
 contrary 
 c
o
n
tra
ry
 
 c
o
n
tr
a
ry
 
 c
on
tra
di
ct
or
y 
 contradictory
Fig. 3: Contradictory of Z(~S)
Lastly, the contradictory of Q(S) (‘It is indeterminately the case that state 
of affairs S obtain’) is ~Q(S) (‘It is not indeterminately the case that state 
of affairs S obtain’), illustrated as follows:
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Z(S) Z(~S)
Q(S)
~Q(S)
~Z(S)~Z(~S)
 contrary 
 c
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 co
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y
 contradictory
Fig. 4: Contradictory of Q(S)
Note that the first two propositions above, Z(S) and Z(~S) (‘will’ and ‘will 
not’) and their contradictories are explicit on the traditional Square. But 
the third proposition, Q(S) (‘might and might not’) and its contradictory 
~Q(S) have now been made explicit.
Z(S) Z(~S)
Q(S)
~Q(S)
~Z(S)~Z(~S)  subcontrary 
 s
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b
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ry
  s
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b
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n
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ry
 
 contrary 
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ry
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ry
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n
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d
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to
ry
 contradictory
Fig. 5: Triangle of Subcontrary Relations
Now let’s consider how the contradictories ~Z(S), ~Z (~S) and ~Q(S) 
are related to each other. Consider the pair ~Z(S) and ~Z(~S). Since 
Q(S) entails both ~Z(S) and ~Z(~S) (by Theorem IV), it is clear that 
they are conjointly true when Q(S)is true. It is equally clear that ~Z(S)
and ~Z(~S) cannot be conjointly false. For if ~Z(S) is false, then Z(S) 
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is true, and if ~Z(~S) is false, then Z(~S) is true. But Z(S) and Z(~S) 
cannot be conjointly true (by Theorems II and III), so ~Z(S) and ~Z(~S) 
cannot be conjointly false. The same results obtain mutatis mutandis 
for the other pairs, (~Z(S) and ~Q(S); ~Z(~S) and ~Q(S)). So, for each 
pair, it is possible that both be true and not possible that both be false, 
which means that they are subcontraries. We thus arrive at a Triangle of 
Subcontraries overlapping with the Triangle of Contrary Relations.
Thus far we have considered contrary, contradictory, and subcontrary 
relations. There remains one more logical relation to consider, namely, 
subaltern relations, which run outward from Z(S), Z(~S), and Q(S). We 
already know from the Square that ~Z(~S) is the subaltern of Z(S). Thus, 
if Z(S) (‘will’) is true, the subaltern ~Z(~S) (‘might’) is necessarily true. 
The same now applies to the relationship between Z(S) and the adjacent 
~Q(S) (‘not “might and might not”’). If Z(S) is true, ~Q(S) must be true. 
Likewise, if Z(~S) (‘will not’) is true, the subaltern ~Z(S) (‘might not’) 
is also true. The same subaltern relationship exists between Z(~S) and 
~Q(S). If Z(~S) is true, ~Q(S) must be true. Lastly, Q(S) (‘might and 
might not’) also has subaltern relations with the adjacent propositions. 
If Q(S) (‘might and might not’) is true, both subalterns ~Z(~S) (‘might’) 
and ~Z(S) (‘might not’) are true.
As figure 7 illustrates, the subaltern relations run from each of the 
three propositions forming our Triangle of Contrary Relations to each 
of the propositions forming the Triangle of Subcontrary Relations, 
completing a Hexagon of Subaltern Relations:
Z(S) Z(~S)
Q(S)
~Q(S)
~Z(S)~Z(~S)  subcontrary 
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n
 
 subaltern 
 subaltern 
Fig. 6: Hexagon of Subaltern Relations
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Note that the traditional Square of Opposition is still present in the 
Hexagon. We have simply enlarged and completed it. Indeed, one should 
notice that in completing the traditional Square we have uncovered two 
other intersecting Squares of Opposition, each exhibiting different truth 
functions but preserving the same logical relations. The traditional 
Square of Opposition is composed of contraries Z(S) and Z(~S) and 
subcontraries ~Z(~S) and ~Z(S). A  second Square is composed of 
contraries Z(S) and Q(S) and subcontraries ~Z(S) and ~Q(S). A  third 
Square is composed of Z(~S) and Q(S) and subcontraries ~Q(S) and 
~Z(~S). The three squares may be highlighted as follows:
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Fig. 7: Three Squares of Opposition
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